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In Favor of “Leader Proofing”
Anthony King
Abstract: Although it is widely assumed that successful polities require strong leaders, something like the op-
posite is probably the case. A successful political system may well be one that has no need of strong leaders 
and may even eschew them. Strong leaders may occasionally be desirable in any polity, but those occasions 
are–or should be–rare. As often as not (possibly more often than not) strong leaders pose substantial risks. 
They are liable to do as much damage as good, possibly more. There is a lot to be said for any polity’s political 
culture and institutions having built into them a fair amount of “leader proofing.” 
Switzerland is undoubtedly one of the world’s most 
successful countries, probably the most successful 
in Europe. It is also one of the world’s most intrigu-
ing countries, because it should probably not ex-
ist. Indeed, the most widely read book on the coun-
try (apart from guidebooks) is entitled Why Switzer-
land?1 Historically, the country has been divided in 
multiple ways: by dauntingly high mountain peaks, 
by language and by religion. Switzerland boasts no 
fewer than four national languages, although a large 
proportion of Swiss can speak only one of them (for 
most, English is their preferred second language). For 
many centuries, the religious divide, between Catho-
lics and Protestants, went deep. Early in the sixteenth 
century, Zwingli preached and practiced his brand of 
revolutionary Protestantism in predominantly Cath-
olic Zurich. Soon afterward, Geneva became a hot-
bed of militant Calvinism. Protestants and Catholics 
fought three civil wars between 1529 and 1847, and a 
constitutional ban on Jesuit priests living and work-
ing in Switzerland was lifted only in 1973.
Yet the Swiss confederation has remained in be-
ing for more than seven centuries, its occasional civil 
wars have been relatively bloodless affairs (certain-
ly as compared with the American Civil War), and 
for generations past the Swiss have been at peace 
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both with their neighbors and with each 
other. Whatever language they speak, Swiss 
people think of themselves as Swiss. Class 
conflict in the country, as well as religious 
conflict, is muted. Violent crime is virtu-
ally unknown. The Swiss are among the 
best-educated people in the world and enjoy 
one of the world’s most advanced health-
care delivery systems. Switzerland is a lib-
eral democracy in the fullest sense of both 
words. Not least, the people of Switzerland 
enjoy one of the highest standards of living 
in the world (however measured). Switzer-
land positively exudes peace and prosperity.
What is intriguing for our purposes, how-
ever, is a zone of silence relating to that 
country. Ask the members of any audience 
anywhere, however well-informed, to name 
anyone who is now, or ever has been, a Swiss 
political leader and the result is invariably 
an embarrassed silence. No one can think of 
anybody. The only person anyone can ever 
think of is William Tell, but Tell–he of the 
famous crossbow and apple–may never 
have existed and, even if he did, it was a very 
long time ago, during Switzerland’s earliest 
days. The Swiss people clearly do not suffer 
from any form of leader addiction.
Britain’s Winston Churchill was a leader, 
in two senses. Formally, he was the leader 
of the Conservative Party and, on two occa-
sions, he served as his country’s prime min-
ister. Less formally, in 1940, when Britain’s 
fortunes in World War II were at their nadir, 
he emerged as the country’s rhetorical and 
symbolic leader. His speeches, cigars and 
defiant V-for-victory gesture are still re-
membered. But in practical military terms 
he was less a leader than a goad, gadfly and 
interferer-in-chief. His military leadership 
was always severely constrained: not mere-
ly by circumstances (Britain’s weaknesses, 
the strengths of the enemy, the increasing 
power of the United States, and so on) but 
also by his need to carry his military, na-
val and air force commanders with him. In 
his dealings with them, he needed to be cir-
cumspect. He could relieve senior officers 
of their commands only when they had de-
monstrably proved ineffective. His pow-
er was overwhelmingly the power to per-
suade; and, when he failed to persuade, as 
he often did, he almost invariably failed 
to achieve his objectives. Especially to-
ward the end of the war, as Britain’s pow-
er waned, Churchill had no option but to 
be collegial, even deferential, in his mode 
of operations.
The position of John F. Kennedy during 
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis differed 
sharply from that of Churchill in 1940. 
Churchill spoke eloquently and often. Ken-
nedy said almost nothing in public. But, in-
formally as well as formally, all the impor- 
tant decisions taken by the United States 
government during the crisis were for Ken-
nedy and Kennedy alone to take. As pres-
ident, he was commander-in-chief, with 
duties he could neither share nor delegate. 
But Kennedy in 1962 found himself in a sit-
uation far outside the orbit of his own per-
sonal experience and without precedent in 
human history. He needed to think long 
and hard–and knew that he did. He also 
needed others’ help as his ideas devel-
oped–and knew that he did.
President Kennedy, someone as grown-
up as Churchill could be child-like, dealt 
with his problem by convening what he 
called the Executive Committee. How-
ever, it was scarcely a committee and cer-
tainly not an executive. Its membership 
fluctuated, and the president continually 
conducted smaller meetings, with vary-
ing personnel. Kennedy’s central concern 
was to keep America’s options open for as 
long as possible and to ensure that all of 
his advisers felt free to speak their minds. 
Toward the latter end, he encouraged his 
advisers to talk among themselves in his 
absence. The president’s brother, Robert 
Kennedy, subsequently wrote: “This was 
wise. Personalities change when the Presi-
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dent is present, and frequently even strong 
men make recommendations on the basis 
of what they believe the President wishes 
to hear.”2 Kennedy continues:
During all these deliberations we all spoke 
as equals. There was no rank, and, in fact, we 
did not even have a chairman. . . . As a result 
. . . the conversations were completely unin-
hibited and unrestricted. Everyone had an 
equal opportunity to express himself and to 
be heard directly. It was a tremendously ad-
vantageous procedure.3
It was out of these informal and semifor-
mal discussions that the idea of imposing 
a naval “quarantine” on Cuba–rather than 
launching air strikes to destroy the Soviets’ 
missile sites on the island–arose. The ul-
timate responsibility and the final deci-
sions were, of necessity, the president’s, but 
throughout, his chosen style was collegial.
An implicit commentary on the func-
tioning of any institution is provided by 
what happens whenever the nominal head 
of that institution is unavailable for any 
reason. How does the institution function 
under those circumstances?
In late June 1953, during his second term 
as prime minister, Churchill suffered a 
stroke which left him partially paralyzed 
down his left side. Initially, it was thought 
he would have to resign, but he retreated to 
his country home, Chartwell, to recuper-
ate and quite quickly–within about eight 
weeks–he recovered. Although the prime 
minister was largely incapacitated, the con-
sequences for the conduct of government 
were minimal. One of his senior colleagues, 
R. A. Butler, “took charge of the Cabinet 
with tact and competence,” and depart-
mental ministers went calmly about their 
business.4 Business as usual also character-
ized Churchill’s last few months in office. 
The old man, now eighty, was increasingly 
lethargic and absent-minded, but few out-
side his inner circle were aware of the ex-
tent of his deterioration and the govern-
ment continued to function normally. It 
seemed not to matter much that during 
these months 10 Downing Street was ef-
fectively unoccupied.
One of Winston Churchill’s former com-
panions-in-arms was similarly ill and in 
office during the same decade. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered a heart at-
tack in September 1955 and then a stroke in 
November 1957. The heart attack kept him 
out of action for approximately a month 
and a half, and he actually recovered more 
quickly from the stroke, although his speech 
was impaired for a time and, like Churchill, 
he briefly contemplated resignation. Poten-
tially, Eisenhower’s illnesses placed a great-
er strain on America’s president-centered–
and therefore individual-centered–gov-
erning arrangements than Churchill’s did 
on Britain’s more loose-textured arrange-
ments. In Britain, ministers simply as-
sumed, rightly, that they would carry on as 
usual, with central direction, if needed, be-
ing provided collectively by the Cabinet. In 
the United States, however, it was far from 
clear what was supposed to happen.
Fortunately, in Eisenhower’s case three 
separate factors eased the strain. One was 
that on both occasions the president was 
only briefly unable to communicate and 
take decisions. Even after the stroke, his 
mental faculties seem to have been unim-
paired. The second was that, by coinci-
dence, no difficult decisions needed to be 
taken during either of the president’s two 
short periods of convalescence. In partic-
ular, no major foreign-affairs crises super-
vened. The third was that Eisenhower, by 
outlook and temperament and despite the 
fact that he had formerly occupied positions 
of high military command, was a firm be-
liever in cabinet government and “sought 
to establish in the executive branch a bu-
reaucratic structure that minimized disrup-
tion caused by the absence of the chief exec-
utive.”5 While he was recovering from his 
heart attack, Sherman Adams, his chief of 
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staff, stayed with him in Denver and relayed 
back to Washington any presidential deci-
sions that had to be taken, while Richard 
Nixon, the vice president, presided over 
Cabinet meetings and meetings of the Na-
tional Security Council. An informal coor-
dinating committee began to meet regularly 
to oversee the government’s operations as 
a whole.6 Although the outward forms dif-
fered, these arrangements resembled quite 
closely the ones that evolved at the top of 
British government following Churchill’s 
stroke.
The aftermath of the attempt on Ronald 
Reagan’s life in 1981 was a good deal messier, 
even though in the meantime a new amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, the Twen-
ty-Fifth Amendment, had been ratified to 
provide for situations in which the presi-
dent was “unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office.” Having been shot 
and seriously wounded, Reagan for several 
hours underwent massive surgery and was 
clearly incapable of discharging the duties 
of his office. He remained poorly and un-
able to do a full day’s work for another two 
months. His White House physician, Dan-
iel Ruge, believed that, during the hour or 
so before his life-saving operation and while 
he was still conscious and in full possession 
of his faculties, Reagan should have been 
asked, under the terms of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, to sign a declaration transfer-
ring his powers temporarily to the vice pres-
ident, who would thereupon serve as act-
ing president. But no such suggestion was 
ever made. All this occurred when Reagan 
had been in office for only sixty days. The 
new administration had scarcely begun to 
bed in, and nothing in the way of contin-
gency planning had been done. “[E]nor-
mous tension and uncertainty permeat-
ed the government.”7 Reagan had already 
proved himself to be a wholesale delega-
tor, but most of his delegations were to indi-
viduals. Nothing resembling Eisenhower’s 
committee system existed.
Instead, what seems to have happened 
is that, with Reagan’s tacit approval, effec-
tive control of the government was taken 
in hand by three members of his White 
House staff: Edwin Meese, James Baker 
and Michael Deaver. This trio of aides be-
came, in effect, the president’s surrogates, 
more than merely his aides. It was an ar-
rangement that emerged immediately fol-
lowing the assassination attempt but then 
lasted for most of the rest of Reagan’s first 
term. Neither Churchill nor Eisenhower 
would have tolerated any such arrange-
ment, but Reagan seems to have been com-
fortable with it.8 The original trio later be-
came a quartet, with the addition of Nancy 
Reagan, the first lady. As we shall see lat-
er, when that collegial arrangement even-
tually broke down, the American system 
of government itself nearly broke down.
How do episodes and observations such 
as these speak to questions of political 
leadership in general and strong political 
leadership in particular? Before answer-
ing that question, it would be a good idea 
to engage in a somewhat more systemat-
ic enquiry, one relating only to liberal de-
mocracies. There is no need to labor that 
last point here. It is well known that polit-
ical leaders in autocratic and authoritarian 
regimes tend to be megalomaniacs, mon-
sters, murderers, liars and crooks.
Archie Brown, in The Myth of the Strong 
Leader, suggests that although the term 
“strong leader” is open to more than one 
interpretation, it is generally taken to mean 
“a leader who concentrates a lot of power 
in his or her hands, dominates both a wide 
swath of public policy and the political par-
ty to which he or she belongs, and takes the 
big decisions.”9 A strong leader on that defi-
nition may or may not be successful in his 
or her own terms or in the judgment of 
others. Equally, a man or woman may be 
successful in his or her own terms and yet 
may not be adjudged by himself, herself or 
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anybody else to have been a strong lead-
er. Strength and success are not the same 
thing, and to infer strength from success 
is, as Daniel Kahneman and others have 
pointed out, a common but primitive type 
of logical fallacy.10 Luck may be the key vari-
able. Alternatively, personal qualities oth-
er than strength may well in practice count 
for more than strength.
By way of illustration, let us consider 
briefly the careers in office of the thirty 
men and one woman who held office as 
either American president or British prime 
minister during the eighty years between 
1935 and 2015.
Given the constraints imposed on the 
power and authority of every American 
president by America’s constitutional 
structure, Franklin Delano Roosevelt has 
to be accounted both strong and success-
ful, his strengths contributing to his suc-
cess. He failed in his attempt to pack the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and only the outbreak 
of World War II brought the Great Depres-
sion to an end; but much of the legacy of 
his New Deal lives on, and his handling of 
America’s noninvolvement then involve-
ment in World War II was masterly. His 
successor, Harry Truman, did not aspire 
to follow in fdr’s gigantic footsteps and 
never tried; as president, he was neither a 
strong leader nor pretended to be one. But 
it was on his watch that the United States 
launched the Marshall Plan, played a lead-
ing role in creating nato and resisted So-
viet-sponsored aggression in Korea. His 
successor, Eisenhower, a thoroughgoing 
conservative, resembled Truman in hav-
ing no great desire to exalt the presiden-
tial office–and he did not do so. His style 
was collegial, his lasting accomplishments 
few. Eisenhower regarded his steady-as-
she-goes presidency as a success. In its own 
terms, it was. His more glamorous succes-
sor, John F. Kennedy, was more ambitious 
for his time in office, but in the event he 
served for fewer than three years, and, but 
for his glamor, his astute handling of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, and the horrific cir-
cumstances of his death, he would proba-
bly be little remembered. Through no fault 
of his own, the ratio of promise to perfor-
mance in his case was high.
That Lyndon Johnson, who succeeded 
Kennedy, was a strong president–in Ar-
chie Brown’s terms or anyone else’s–can-
not be doubted. The big Texan was also a 
big president. In terms of success, his per-
formance, however, was Janus-faced: on 
one side, his ambitious domestic Great So-
ciety programs (including the War on Pov-
erty and radical civil-rights legislation); 
on the other, the ill-advised escalation of 
American involvement in the war in Viet-
nam. Johnson withdrew from the race for 
the presidency in 1968. Richard Nixon, the 
man who subsequently won that election, 
certainly aspired to be a strong president 
and took steps to extend his and his allies’ 
sway across the entire executive branch. 
Had Nixon retired on the eve of the 1972 
election, historians today would probably 
account him a success. He began to wind 
down American involvement in Vietnam, 
normalized U.S. relations with China, initi-
ated détente with the Soviet Union and in-
stituted a wide range of domestic reforms. 
Unfortunately for him and his reputation, 
his vanity and mendacity during the Water-
gate scandal forced him from office. Nix-
on’s successor, his vice president, Gerald 
Ford, remained in office for only eighteen 
months. He attempted to accomplish little 
and succeeded in doing just that.
The next two presidencies–those of Jim-
my Carter and Ronald Reagan–were among 
the strangest of modern times. Carter, a 
complete novice to the ways of Washing-
ton, sought to be a strong president, not in 
the sense of being constantly in control, but 
in the sense of advancing a bold agenda. Ap-
parently failing to recognize that, in Bis-
marck’s memorable phrase, “politics is the 
art of the possible,” he never sought to per-
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fect and practice that art. His boldness did 
bring him some successes: civil-service re-
form, the return of the Panama Canal Zone 
to Panama and the signing of the Camp Da-
vid peace accords between Egypt and Is-
rael. But his political clumsiness ensured 
that many of his legislative proposals were 
blocked in Congress, and he signally failed 
to persuade either congressional majorities 
or the American people that the energy cri-
sis of the late 1970s really was “the moral 
equivalent of war” and needed to be con-
fronted as such.
If we accept Brown’s definition of strong 
leadership, then Ronald Reagan, Carter’s 
successor in the White House, was one of 
the weakest presidents of recent decades. 
He did not concentrate a lot of power in 
his own hands. He did not dominate a 
wide swath of public policy. And he did 
not take, except in a purely formal sense, 
most of the big decisions. As we noted ear-
lier, from the time of the failed attempt on 
the president’s life, only two months into 
his presidency, until toward the end of his 
first term in office, most of the domestic 
policy decisions that emanated from the 
Oval Office, while signed off by the presi-
dent, were in fact the work of Meese, Bak-
er and Deaver, possibly with inputs from 
Nancy Reagan. The members of this troika 
did not operate in isolation from the rest 
of the government, but the president him-
self largely did. Following Reagan’s reelec-
tion in 1984, the original members of the 
troika dispersed, and the troika imploded 
into the person of a single individual: Don-
ald Regan, the new White House chief of 
staff. He, too, positioned himself between 
the president and the rest of his adminis-
tration; but whereas the three members of 
the troika had been subtle, emollient and 
protective of the president, Regan lacked 
both political feel and any instinct for pro-
tecting Reagan’s interests. He was deep-
ly implicated in the Iran-contra affair and 
did not prevent Reagan himself from be-
coming implicated. Throughout his time 
in the White House, Reagan relied heavily 
on his support staff, whatever there was of 
it. When that staff failed him, he failed–
or did not even try.
However, there was one front on which 
Reagan was anything but weak. On that one 
front, he held strong views, held onto them 
tenaciously and acted upon them. That 
was America’s relationship with the Sovi-
et Union. Reagan’s views were often misun-
derstood and to the outside world could eas-
ily appear contradictory. On the one hand, 
he believed that the Soviet Union really 
did constitute an “evil empire” and that the 
United States, in all its dealings with the So-
viet Union, should therefore do so from a 
position of strength. And so he promoted 
massive increases in U.S. defense spending. 
But, on the other hand, he was terrified by 
the possibility that someday someone, or 
something, would trigger an all-out nuclear 
war. He feared that sooner or later–absent 
some kind of Soviet-American rapproche-
ment–the triggering of such a war would 
prove all but inevitable. He therefore went 
out of his way to seek a rapprochement with 
the ussr; and, as luck would have it, ear-
ly in his second term he found someone, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom he felt he 
could do business. On this issue, Reagan got 
stuck in: not in the sense of mastering de-
tail (he never did that) but in the sense of 
taking a close continuing interest in Amer-
ica’s relations with Russia. Between them, 
Reagan and Gorbachev effectively negoti-
ated the beginning of the end of the Cold 
War. President Reagan proved capable of 
strength when, in his own eyes, strength 
was needed.
Neither of Reagan’s successors in the 
Oval Office–George H. W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton–was an especially strong presi-
dent, though Clinton’s charm and larger-
than-life personality sometimes concealed 
the fact. The elder George Bush, like Eisen-
hower and Ford before him, did not have an 
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exalted conception of either himself or the 
presidential office. He had held many low-
er-level positions in government and, when 
he arrived in the White House, was content 
to do the top job to the best of his (consid-
erable) ability. He was not remotely a pres-
idential imperialist. However, few doubted 
his basic competence, especially in foreign 
affairs. He guided skillfully American poli-
cy during the reunification of Germany and 
the disintegration of the ussr itself, and 
his was the victory over Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq during the First Gulf War. Although it 
cost him dearly politically, he was strong 
enough in 1990 to break his own election 
pledge–“Read my lips: no new taxes”–in 
the interests of scaling back the U.S. gov-
ernment’s burgeoning budget deficit. Had 
Bush senior won reelection in 1992, and had 
he then carried on much as before, history 
today would almost certainly account him 
a modest, Eisenhower-like success. Even as 
it is, he can hardly be accounted a failure.
Bill Clinton was more ambitious, for both 
himself and his presidency. He evident-
ly saw himself as his generation’s fdr or 
jfk; in other words, as an archetypal strong 
leader. Unfortunately for him, his personal 
limitations, together with the rampant po-
larization of contemporary American pol-
itics, resulted in an eight-year tenure of of-
fice that was more memorable (sometimes 
for the wrong reasons) than effective. He 
lacked any real sense of direction, and the 
men and women he appointed to his ad-
ministration, many of them exceeding-
ly able, were unable either to provide him 
with such a sense or even to persuade him 
that he needed one. Clinton sought to paint 
a big picture but could never find the right 
canvas and colors to fit the frame. Espe-
cially in its early days, the administration’s 
modus operandi often resembled an unfo-
cussed conversation at an academic confer-
ence more than a meeting of a tough-mind-
ed advisory board. Eisenhower would have 
been horrified.
Predictably, given Clinton’s personal 
style, his capacity for dithering and the 
fact that the Republicans controlled Con-
gress during six of his eight years in office, 
Clinton’s record as president was a thing 
of shreds and patches. He persuaded Con-
gress to ratify the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, outfaced Newt Gingrich 
and the Republicans over the 1996 budget 
and helped broker the Dayton Accords, 
which brought peace, of a sort, to Bosnia. 
On his watch, the enormous budget defi-
cits accumulated by his profligate Repub-
lican predecessors, Reagan and Bush, were 
eliminated. But, against all that, Clinton 
and his wife badly botched their vain effort 
to introduce a universal health care regime 
in the United States, Clinton in 1996 felt 
forced to sign Republican-inspired wel-
fare legislation which he abhorred, few of 
his own legislative proposals found their 
way onto the statute book, and he never 
developed a coherent conception of what 
America’s role in a rapidly changing world 
should be. It did not help that Clinton had 
to devote much of his second term to deal-
ing with the fall-out from his bizarre rela-
tionship with Monica Lewinsky. As Fred 
I. Greenstein has put it, Clinton is likely 
to be remembered “as a politically talent-
ed underachiever.”11
George W. Bush, Bush senior’s son, is 
unlikely to be remembered as an achiev-
er of any kind. He is more likely to be re-
membered as one of the most inept occu-
pants of the White House since that ele-
gant building was first occupied in 1801. His 
handling of the aftermath of Hurricane Ka-
trina, which devastated much of New Orle-
ans, was both chaotic and insensitive. Un-
der him the era of escalating federal budget 
deficits returned. His administration’s re-
sponse to the September 11 terrorist attacks 
succeeded in dislodging the Taliban from 
their control of most of Afghanistan, but 
failed to either capture Osama bin Laden 
or destroy al Qaeda. Subsequently, Amer-
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ican troops in Afghanistan waged war for 
more than a decade against Islamist and an-
ti-Western insurgents. That war was Amer-
ica’s longest-ever. It was never won. Two 
years after 9/11, in March 2003, Bush ex-
tended his administration’s self-declared 
“War on Terror” to Iraq, although there 
was no evidence to suggest that Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq, however unpleas-
ant, had anything to do with either al Qae-
da or terrorism. In the Iraq case, military 
victory was quickly achieved and Saddam 
Hussein toppled; but–partly in response 
to the administration’s mismanagement 
of post-Saddam Iraq–what amounted to 
a civil war ensued, one in which Ameri-
can forces were involved for seven more 
years. Needless to say, terrorism in the 
Middle East and elsewhere has not been 
eliminated. On the contrary, since 2003, 
it has spread, becoming ever more brutal. 
The terrorists have scored greater success-
es than President George W. Bush ever did.
One feature of Bush’s deportment in of-
fice stands out. Bush aspired to be a strong 
leader; and, indubitably, he was a strong 
leader, at least during his first term. He 
made it abundantly clear to everyone who 
would listen that that was his aim (adding 
on occasion that he had God’s backing). 
Following the intervention in Afghani-
stan, he told the well-connected journal-
ist Bob Woodward: “I rely on my instincts. 
I just knew that at some point in time [im-
mediately after 9/11] the American people 
were going to say, Where is he? . . . Where’s 
your leadership?”12 The American people 
wanted action; Bush was intent on provid-
ing it. The same went for Iraq. He want-
ed Saddam Hussein ousted from power. 
That would be made to happen. To quote 
Greenstein again: “George W. Bush had 
no lack of policy vision. He took it as an ar-
ticle of faith that if he failed to set his ad-
ministration’s policy agenda, others would 
set it for him.”13 He never allowed them to. 
Unfortunately, Bush’s vision did nothing 
to promote, but instead badly damaged, 
America’s interests.
Mirrors can magnify as well as accurate-
ly reflect, and Bush allowed his vision to be 
both mirrored and magnified by his chosen 
circles of advisers. Over both Afghanistan 
and Iraq, he listened almost exclusively to 
those who already agreed with him, the so-
called neocons: notably, Dick Cheney, his 
influential vice president, Donald Rums-
feld, his forceful defense secretary, and 
Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy. Those 
who expressed doubts or entered caveats–
Colin Powell, the secretary of state, Con-
doleezza Rice, the national security advis-
er, and a substantial proportion of the mil-
itary–were sidelined. Bush’s approach to 
decision-making was thus the opposite of 
Kennedy’s during the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis. The same approach to decision-mak-
ing, coupled with Bush’s “vision thing,” 
that of a low-tax, lightly regulated econo-
my, also played its part in the great finan-
cial collapse of 2008.14 
Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, could 
hardly have come into office at a worse 
time. Bush’s legacy was dire: a domestic 
economy in deep recession and large num-
bers of American soldiers still being killed 
in the ruinous and arguably useless wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, by the 
time Obama took over, American politics 
was even more polarized than it had been 
in Bill Clinton’s time. Although Obama 
disappointed liberal Democrats and out-
raged a large proportion of Republicans, 
some of whom positively hated him, he 
will leave the White House in early 2017 
having led America out of recession (far 
more successfully than any European lead-
er), wound down American involvement 
in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
succeeded, where both Truman and Clin-
ton failed, in introducing a state-spon-
sored universal health care delivery sys-
tem. History will almost certainly judge 
Obama, not to have been a barn-storm-
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ing or triumphalist president, but to have 
been a dignified, pragmatic and broadly 
successful one. He may not have been a 
strong leader–in the face of Republican 
and interest-group opposition he often ap-
peared weak–but more often than not he 
got his way.
One of the most confident and balanced 
of modern presidents, Obama was far 
more Kennedy-like than Bush-like in his 
willingness to appoint advisers with strong 
views, not necessarily his own. As he said 
on the eve of his inauguration:
I think that’s how the best decisions are 
made. One of the dangers in a White House, 
based on my reading of history, is that you 
get wrapped up in groupthink and everybody 
agrees with everything and there’s no discus-
sion and there are no dissenting views. So 
I’m going to be welcoming a vigorous debate 
inside the White House. But understand, I 
will be setting policy as president. I will be 
responsible for the vision that this team car-
ries out, and I expect them to implement that 
vision once decisions are made.15
Once in office, he was true to both parts of 
that utterance.
It would seem that, of the thirteen U.S. 
presidents who have held office since 
the late 1930s, only four–Franklin Roos-
evelt, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and 
George W. Bush–have been strong lead-
ers in anything approaching Brown’s sense. 
Only those four–plus, arguably, Kennedy 
and Carter–have sought to concentrate 
an unusual amount of power in their own 
hands and to dominate the formation and 
implementation of a wide range of govern-
ment policies. It is noteworthy, to say the 
least of it, that two of the four strongest 
leaders listed above–Nixon and George W. 
Bush–have been among the least satisfac-
tory of modern presidents, with the Viet-
nam War meaning that Lyndon Johnson’s 
record in office was also, to put it charita-
bly, mixed. Strong presidents have not con-
sistently been admired or admirable. At 
the same time, many perfectly satisfacto-
ry presidents–and, happily, most modern 
American presidents have been at least sat-
isfactory–have not sought to function and 
have not functioned in any kind of “strong 
leader” mode. Thus, the correlation be-
tween strength and success is low and, de-
pending on one’s own personal judgments, 
may even be negative.
Our survey of British prime ministers 
during the same eighty-year period can be 
shorter, for one simple reason. It has nev-
er occurred to the great majority of Brit-
ish prime ministers to try to function as 
strong leaders. They have not been direct-
ly elected and are not ceremonial heads of 
state as well as heads of government. They 
owe their position to the fact that they are 
the leader, for the time being, of the cur-
rently victorious political party, and they 
well know that they can be ousted from 
that particular position at any time (with-
out the electorate’s having any say in the 
matter). Most of them have forceful and 
able colleagues who are also their rivals. 
Given the essentially collegial nature of 
British government, most prime minis-
ters see their primary tasks as promoting 
their party’s agreed-to policies, maintain-
ing the unity of their government and par-
ty and coping ad hoc with crises. Notions 
of strong leadership seldom come into it.
Sixteen individuals have held office as 
British prime minister since 1935, two of 
them (Winston Churchill and Harold Wil-
son) on two separate occasions. The great 
majority of them, like the great majority 
of American presidents, have been com-
petent, sometimes more than competent, 
but most of them–too many to list here–
have not sought to direct and dominate 
their administrations. They have func-
tioned as executive chairmen rather than 
chief executive officers. One outstanding 
exception has already been mentioned: 
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Winston Churchill during World War 
II, especially during its early phases. But 
during his second, postwar premiership, 
even Churchill in no way dominated, or 
sought to dominate, his government. His 
successor, Anthony Eden, was more force-
ful and developed a reputation, similar to 
Jimmy Carter’s, for paying overmuch at-
tention to detail and attempting to micro-
manage his administration. Eden’s suc-
cessor, Harold Macmillan, functioned for 
the most part as a conventional premier, 
though he was more given than most to 
taking personal initiatives, including try-
ing to take the United Kingdom into the 
European Common Market. Harold Wil-
son towered above his colleagues politi-
cally during the first phase of his first ad-
ministration, but within a few years his au-
thority had all but vanished, and during 
his second term he was an almost entirely 
passive figure. The present occupant of 10 
Downing Street, David Cameron, is a more 
typical British premier: more a light-touch 
chairman of the board and public-rela-
tions chief than an actual head of govern-
ment. He is certainly not in any conceiv-
able sense a strong leader.
Apart from the wartime Churchill, only 
four post-1935 British prime ministers have 
sought to play the role of strong leader: 
Neville Chamberlain (though his inclusion 
in this list will probably come as a surprise 
to most readers), Edward Heath, Marga-
ret Thatcher and Tony Blair. A word about 
each of them is in order.
Neville Chamberlain, although consid-
erably more intelligent than George W. 
Bush and with far greater governmental 
experience, functioned as prime minister 
in a manner not unlike Bush’s. Like Bush, 
he was determined–in contrast to his im-
mediate predecessor, Stanley Baldwin–
to be a strong leader. On becoming prime 
minister in 1937, he expressed in a letter to 
a friend “some relief at being able to carry 
out my own ideas without having to con-
vert someone else first.” He freely admit-
ted his determination to “leave my mark 
behind me as P.M.”16
Chamberlain had a clear sense of direc-
tion. He was determined upon “the ap-
peasement of Europe” and Hitler in par-
ticular. Toward that end, although Brit-
ain’s cabinet system required him to listen 
to those who disagreed with him, he ap-
peared to hear only those who applauded 
him. Just as President Bush, over Afghan-
istan and Iraq, heard only Cheney and the 
other neocons, so Chamberlain in his deal-
ings with Hitler increasingly relied on the 
views of a close aide, Sir Horace Wilson, 
and a small “group of trusted advisers who 
all passionately shared his vision and pri-
orities.”17 Bush sidelined the State Depart-
ment, headed by Colin Powell. Chamber-
lain sidelined the Foreign Office, headed 
by an official who doubted whether a man 
like Hitler could possibly be appeased. It 
goes without saying that Chamberlain’s 
leadership, while undoubtedly strong, was 
not exactly successful.18
Edward Heath succeeded Harold Wil-
son as prime minister in 1970. Heath’s style 
was certainly more collegial than Chamber-
lain’s had been. Unlike Chamberlain, he 
was a good if sometimes impatient listener, 
and he readily talked to people he thought 
worth listening to, even if they questioned 
his views. Nevertheless, by force of intellect 
and personality, he dominated his govern-
ment–and dominated it across the board–
to an extent that few of his predecessors 
had. That said, his strength in office man-
ifested itself in one curious way. Heath al-
ways had a clear sense of direction, but he 
frequently changed direction, sometimes 
abruptly. His government’s policy U-turns, 
well advertised and much mocked at the 
time, played a part in the government’s de-
feat in an election forced upon him when he 
had been in office for less than four years. 
In the event, almost every one of the Heath 
government’s policy initiatives, whatever 
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their direction, failed to survive his gov-
ernment. His government’s only substan-
tial achievement–and it was a substantial 
one–was to negotiate Britain’s entry into 
what is now the European Union. More 
than four decades on, even that achieve-
ment was being called in question.
Margaret Thatcher was an even stronger 
leader than Heath and an infinitely more 
successful one. She probably conformed 
more than any other modern head of gov-
ernment on either side of the Atlantic to 
Brown’s template of the strong political 
leader. A highly intelligent workaholic 
with few if any interests outside politics, 
she managed to combine, almost unique-
ly, a strong sense of strategic direction 
with an ability and a willingness to attend 
to the minutest details. “The Old Testa-
ment prophets,” she once said, “did not 
say, ‘Brothers, I want a consensus.’ They 
said: ‘This is my faith, this is what I pas-
sionately believe.’”19 She believed in free 
markets and private enterprise and from 
the outset was determined to be prime 
minister of a government whose members 
spoke with one voice in promoting both: 
“I’ve got to have togetherness. There must 
be a dedication to a purpose, agreement 
about direction . . . [My government] must 
be a conviction government . . . As Prime 
Minister, I could not waste time having any 
internal arguments.”20 She silenced doubt 
and criticism among the ranks of her min-
isters by the simple expedient of firing 
the doubters and critics. As well as being 
the Churchill of the 1982 Falklands War, 
she and her loyal colleagues virtually de-
stroyed the power of Britain’s trade unions 
and launched the world’s first large-scale 
program of privatization. Only in the last 
few years of her premiership did she suf-
fer from the hubris and mental self-isola-
tion that led to her fall, coordinated by her 
fellow Conservatives.
The case of Tony Blair is a strange one. 
On the one hand, there can be no doubt 
that he aspired to be a Thatcher-like lead-
er and probably had the capacity to be one; 
prior to the election that brought him to 
power in 1997, one of his closest advisers 
actually suggested that the British system 
of government should become less feu-
dal and more Napoleonic.21 On the other 
hand, Blair was far less clear than Thatcher 
had been about exactly what he wanted to 
achieve in government, and he had a pow-
erful colleague, Gordon Brown, his chan-
cellor of the exchequer, whom he could 
neither control nor dismiss. Brown, who 
coveted Blair’s job and eventually seized 
it, found every opportunity he could 
think of–and there were many–to ei-
ther bounce Blair or thwart him; but his 
standing in the financial markets as chan-
cellor and among the Labour Party’s rank 
and file, to whom he continually appealed, 
was such that the political price to be paid 
for dismissing him was likely to be exorbi-
tant. As Lyndon Johnson would have put 
it, it was better to have Brown inside the 
tent pissing out than outside the tent piss-
ing in. The so-called Blair government was 
thus in reality a quarrelsome Blair/Brown 
duopoly, with two would-be strong lead-
ers constantly struggling for supremacy–
as though the United States had two rival 
presidents at the same time. That said, it 
was Blair rather than Brown who ensured 
that the United Kingdom joined the Unit-
ed States in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The 
most momentous decision of the Blair pre-
miership, with Blair casting himself in the 
role of strong leader, was also the most di-
sastrous, including to Blair’s reputation.
As in the case of the United States, it 
would seem that the relationship in Britain 
between strong leadership and successful 
leadership is tenuous and may even, pos-
sibly, be negative. Among the acknowl-
edged strong leaders, the wartime Win-
ston Churchill and later Margaret Thatch-
er were undoubted successes; but Neville 
Chamberlain and Edward Heath were 
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both failures as prime minister–Cham-
berlain in the grand manner–and history 
will probably remember Tony Blair more 
for his enthusiastic participation in the 
American-led invasion of Iraq than for any 
of his other initiatives as prime minister. 
Conversely, for example, Clement Attlee, 
not so far mentioned in this essay, was one 
of the most successful and respected prime 
ministers of the modern era; but he laid 
no claim to being a strong leader. He was 
merely shrewd, calm, sensible and, when 
occasion required, stubborn. He was also, 
famously, someone who never used one 
word when none would do. As in the Unit-
ed States, few modern British prime min-
isters have been hopelessly inept, though 
Neville Chamberlain and one or two oth-
ers–including Anthony Eden, the princi-
pal author of Britain’s part in the aborted 
Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956, 
and Gordon Brown, once he succeeded in 
displacing Blair in 2007–have come close.
What inferences should we draw from 
the above? The following half-dozen prop-
ositions–set out in terse summary form–
are at least worth contemplating. Some are 
personal judgments, some are empirical hy-
potheses, and some are a mixture of the two.
1) Many of the best-governed liberal de-
mocracies in the world–notably but not 
only Switzerland–owe their good govern-
ment in large part to the fact that their po-
litical institutions and political culture ob-
viate the need for strong leaders.
2) Strong leaders may on occasion be 
desirable, even essential, as in the case of 
the United States during the Great De-
pression or Britain in 1940. But strong 
leaders should be allowed to emerge only 
on special occasions. A country constant-
ly in need of strong leaders is a country in 
trouble.
3) Strong leaders are high-risk individ-
uals. They may do good, but even in liber-
al democracies they are likely to do more 
harm than good, quite possibly a lot more 
harm.
4) A successful liberal democracy is li-
able to be one that is effectively “leader 
proofed,” one in which it is not made abso-
lutely impossible, but is made difficult, for 
a strong leader to acquire and wield power 
and in which the government does not rely 
on strong leaders for its long-term success.
5) Leaders who rely on the advice only 
of those whose advice they find congenial 
should be viewed with suspicion, especial-
ly, but not only, if the group of acceptable 
advice-givers is small and tightly knit, op-
erating to the exclusion of others. Colle-
giality, in fact as well as form, makes for 
better government than individuality, pro-
vided individuals are permitted, indeed re-
quired, to make their views known.
6) Given that leaders, strong as well as 
weak, are liable to illnesses, mental as well 
as physical, prudence suggests that ar-
rangements should be made in advance ei-
ther to dispose of such leaders (as can easi-
ly be done in the case of British prime min-
isters) or to have their functions performed 
by some other person or persons. 
We began with Switzerland and can 
usefully end there. In 2015, a high-flying 
Swiss banker (than whom few bankers fly 
higher) was asked at a private gathering to 
name the current Swiss prime minister. He 
confessed that he could not remember. He 
thought it was a woman (it was), but even 
of that he could not be sure. Switzerland 
must be one of the most thoroughly leader- 
proofed countries on the planet. Being 
leader-proofed does not seem to have done 
Switzerland any harm.
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